Why DOE Is Intervening in PJM and MISO

The U.S. Department of Energy is using emergency powers to keep more power plants available, in two very different places. In PJM, which runs the grid from Chicago to the Mid-Atlantic, a warm October has met plants taken offline for maintenance and transmission lines that cannot carry power where it is needed. In MISO, which covers much of the Midwest, DOE has stopped three coal plants from closing on schedule.

The two situations call for different readings. The data suggest PJM is trying to get through a few stressed evenings, while MISO's orders are about keeping supply around until new construction catches up with demand. Neither order tells us how much extra electricity was actually produced.

The revealing number is inside PJM's outage outlook. Across the October 8–14 reports for the same October 14 operating date, planned and maintenance outages fell by 10,550 MW. But forced outages, the unplanned breakdowns that cannot be scheduled around, rose from 6,198 MW to 11,996 MW, offsetting 55% of that reduction. The total improved while the less predictable part nearly doubled. These are changes in reported outlooks, rather than a count of equipment that returned or newly failed. The underlying dataset preserves those vintages.

Location compounds the problem. In the hour beginning 6 p.m. Eastern on October 13, BGE's verified real-time hourly price was $2,370.65/MWh, against $1,770.05/MWh at Western Hub. Congestion, the price of squeezing power through limited transmission lines, explained 91% of the gap. The hourly price record separates the energy, congestion and loss components. Additional generation matters only if the network can deliver it where and when it is needed.

DOE's October 13–16 order gives PJM conditional operating relief for listed generators and last-resort access to eligible backup resources. PJM used demand response on October 13 and 14; its October 14 update said large-load backup generation had not been needed to that point. The order expands the operator's options without establishing how much extra generation those options delivered.

DOE's MISO orders hold Campbell available through November 14, and Schahfer Units 17–18 and Culley Unit 2 through December 18, 2026. DOE cites continuing resource-adequacy risk to justify retaining these plants.

There is important counterevidence to a blanket shortage narrative. MISO's 2026/27 auction met its capacity requirements across all four seasons. Its fall planning reserve margin, the cushion of supply above expected peak demand, cleared at 17.3%, above an initial 11.6% target. That is a seasonal planning result, not a live reserve reading. MISO's own winter-storm review describes reserves stranded in the South and emergency assistance from PJM: capacity on paper and power deliverable during a particular emergency are different tests.

For PJM, the near-term question is whether equipment returns fast enough for the demand it must serve. Finishing maintenance should help, but the rising forced-outage outlook shows why a falling scheduled-outage total alone is insufficient reassurance. The October 16 expiry is the next decision point for the present order; daily use reports and any extension will show whether PJM still needs the additional authority. This is an operating test, not a forecast that the pressure ends on that date.

MISO's longer test is whether proposed supply arrives as demand grows. The June OMS-MISO survey reports five-year demand-growth scenarios of 3.1%–5.1% annually, alongside utility plans averaging 15 GW of new accredited summer capacity per year over its 2027/28–2031/32 horizon. Those are plans and forecasts. If construction falls behind, pressure to retain existing plants can persist; delivery would reduce that pressure. Commissioning, retirements and revised demand forecasts will tell us more than the next order announcement alone.

Follow PJM Radar, MISO Radar and the MISO Energy Wire. Our September demand-response reconstruction examines another episode of operating pressure.